her scream!" In this case, the old lady is all the characters in a conversation piece in which the dialogue itself remains unreported in favor of the real subject o f the visit at Lambton:
The odd thing here is that very little narrative is devoted to the visit as such: we are told nothing, or virtually nothing, o f anything anyone says. What takes place takes place as if in silence or as if in secret, yet not quite silently or secretly. The real subject never reaches the level or condition o f something actually spoken, but neither is this subject an inward, private, or psychological affair. Things take place beneath the surface o f words and action and explicit behavior-but the question is: What is this subsurface reality and how is it to be arrived at or recovered? (p. 112)
The "subsurface" created by a writer content to summarize proposals of marriage is that o f what is not, and should not be, said in polite society. In Bruns's reading, Austen emerges as the most realistic of writers, and one who puts m ere naturalists to shame.
The chapter which follows the one on Austen is also excellent. Bruns relates Gerard Manley Hopkins' observations of nature and poetic theory to nineteenth-century physics in an admirably lucid discussion. By the end o f the book, Bruns is able to assert triumphantly, "Identity is conferred from the outside in, not (as Cartesians suppose) from the inside out." The reason he chose to confer m eaning from the outside on Descartes is clear now, and brings me to the sense in which this book, by definition, fails. Bruns's secret purpose throughout Inventions has been to discredit his enemies, the philosophers, by using the weapons of his own party, the rhetoricians, or, in a m ore traditional sense, the poets, since Bruns's rhetori cian nothing affirmeth, and so never lieth. The underlying theme o f the book is the contrast between the two parties, which supplies what coher ency, other than that o f historical outline, the book possesses. It is the single m ost com m on m otif in the book. W hat Bruns calls "the antagonism between rhetoric and philosophy" is the real subject o f Inventions, and what are actually the most useful and interesting portions o f the book, the insights into individual texts which vindicate as well as dem onstrate Bruns's method, read like m ere by-products o f his war-reporting. I say this book fails "by definition," that is, because Bruns's own definition o f the purpose o f his book precludes the most effective use of what ought to be effectual weapons. Bruns sees these weapons as those of his opponents, and cannot allow himself to use them. He attem pts to disarm the philoso phers by conceding that, by their standards, the rhetoricians get nowhere: "But the rhetorician does not desire to get anywhere .... He does not, for example, seek to solve problem s." But his adoption o f the persona o f rhetor fails, precisely because he despairs o f "certainty" and rejects the philoso pher's "piety," which could supply its lack. He does not have the talent o f Socrates (who also affirmed nothing), and the final result o f his skeptical mask is not, as he intended, to support his truths by indirection rather than assertion, but to spoil the tone o f the book. Rather, Inventions has no tone, and this creates an impression that the style itself is at fault, which it is not. W hen Bruns writes about something, he is quite easy to follow; when he writes around something, as he too often does, the book is unreadable, the fine ideas and insights buried under a heap o f weighty nothings.
I know that any academic who writes clearly runs the risk o f his col leagues' scorn for "popularizing"; m ore seriously, he exposes himself to the charge of being wrong, since if no one knows what he is talking about no one can tell if he is right or not. For example, it is easy to find cases of overstatement, simplification, errors o f interpretation in so fine a work of historical criticism as Russell Fraser's The Dark Ages A nd The Age of Gold (Princeton, 1973) , just because Fraser defends his thesis, that the two epochs o f the title ought to have each others' names, with real passion and energy, if not piety. But I found Fraser's book impossible to put, or in the norm al case o f literary criticism, throw down, while if I had n 't taken careful notes on the well-hidden beauties o f Inventions, I w ouldn't rem em ber a single one. I am not arguing that a critic should write like Jam es Branch Cabell, but if any writer declares himself o f the party o f the poets, or rhetors, and forsakes the philosophers' arm or (often rusty and creaking, to be sure) o f Absolute Truth, as Bruns claims to do here, he should make sure he uses the weapons o f his own side well, the weapons o f beauty and clarity and a style suited to the matter. By conceding too much to his enemies at the beginning, Bruns cripples himself before the battle begins, since his style reflects only his own doubts and hestitations before their weapons. He would have done better to leave the philosophers alone and written "A Brief Outline of the History o f Interpretation, With Projections As to the Future," as the most interesting and useful part o f Inventions. O r he should have rem em bered the words o f that guerilla philosopher, who lurks around the peripheries o f the interpre tive camp with an eye, no doubt, to the throats o f the boys and ponies: "And if you cannot be saints o f knowledge, at least be its w arriors."
